A question of ethics – part two
September 6th, 2009We need to begin by addressing in more detail the philosophical objection we alluded to in the preceding discussion before we proceed too far into a discussion of meta-ethics. As we saw, some people fundamentally object to this type of philosophical analysis on the grounds that they know perfectly well what they mean by terms, that there is a `common-sense’ view that they are happy with, and that no amount of philosophical speculation is going to change their minds. We can see parallels in the study of metaphysics, where amongst other things, the physical reality of the universe is questioned and sometimes even denied. It is argued that since the only information we have about the universe comes through our senses, we have no `direct contact’ with it, and thus may be fundamentally mistaken as to its nature. The most extreme cases are those when we could imagine ourselves to be `brains in a vat’, where some (presumably malevolent) scientist is merely pumping sensory data into our brains which are entirely convincing, and causing us to believe in a physical universe which is entirely imaginary. Others suggest that although our reality is `real’, it is not physical, and that the idea of a universe which consisted of pure consciousness and nothing else would be equally consistent with the observed evidence.
It is argued that this kind of speculation is useless and futile, that there `seems’ to be a physical universe, that regardless of what its nature might be it acts just like a physical universe would act, and that this type of speculation actually has no effect at all on how we live our lives, so that at best it’s an academic point. There is certainly more than a small amount of validity in this type of position, but it does not cover all philosophical inquiry altogether. In particular it does not extend to ethics and morality.
People may claim, for instance, that they know perfectly well what they mean by statements such as `murder is wrong’, and that no amount of philosophical speculation is going to change that. They may argue that, even if it is accepted that a study into the nature of what we mean by `morality’ is not entirely devoid of merit, such a study has little practical application, since we appear to have a well-developed `moral sense’ which functions perfectly well regardless of what the underlying `reality’ of morality might appear to be.
One of the key questions within meta-ethics is whether `morality’ has any objective existence outside of the minds of people, in other words whether `right’ and `wrong’ are independently existing qualities in the same way that mass or velocity are. The `argument from queerness’ presented by Mackie argues that such qualities would be exceedingly strange, and of a completely different order to other qualities which we believe to exist in the universe. Therefore, it is argued, morality is not `real’ because it is essentially impossible to imagine what kind of `stuff’ it could possibly be made from. However, to argue for the non-existence of morality on this basis alone would be premature, as there are plenty of other concepts — such as politeness, courage, beauty, and honour — which are equally devoid of physical `reality’, and which arise purely as a result of consciousness and the interaction between people, but which nevertheless are perfectly sensible and meaningful qualities. It is perfectly widely recognised that beauty, for instance, is not something inherent in an object, but a reaction of an observer to it. The phrase `beauty is in the eye of the beholder’ states this explicitly. Yet there is nobody who would argue that beauty `does not exist’ for this reason, despite the universally accepted fact that one person might find something beautiful, and another may find it hideous. Read the rest of this post »